![]() In other words, doubling its weight will reduce its trafficability by a factor of eight. Studies have shown that the “trafficability” of an MBT (its ability to use the European road network) declines as the cube of its weight. This combination of excessive size and weight has a significant impact on strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. Large size comes hand in hand with increased weight, topping 70 tonnes in some cases as previously mentioned. Plus their physical size limits the ways in which they can be transported, with the height/width/weight tolerances of road and railway bridges and tunnels being one example. ![]() Agility plays a part too, of course, but if we look at the size of current western MBT fleets the vehicles are all large and bulky and therefore are essentially big targets. An important aspect of any AFV’s survivability on the battlefield is its ability not to be detected, and if detected, not to be targeted and hit. The last aspect I wish to deal with here, although there are many others, is that of size and weight. Damage to these extra-armour appendages may severely restrict a vehicle’s operational capabilities, if not render it incapacitated altogether. The end result has been that many modern MBTs look like tinkers’ caravans with all the bits and pieces that have been added, and these additions look extremely vulnerable to such mundane things as artillery shrapnel and small arms fire. However, the vast majority of these upgrades have been added on top of, not integrated with, the vehicles’ basic armour protection. As technology has evolved to meet the defensive and offensive needs of modern vehicles, various add-ons – like active protective systems (APS), remote weapons systems (RWS), thermal imaging (TI) sights and the like – have been applied retrospectively to existing designs. I also have concerns about the vulnerability of western MBTs and AFVs to less sophisticated threats. There are already cannons and ammunition optimised in the anti-drone role and possibly even laser weapons in the fullness of time, but they’re still some way down the road. And, again, currently the UK plans to procure only 60 systems for its pathetically small planned fleet of 148 Challenger 3s. ![]() Yes, there are systems available to counter the drone/top attack missiles threat – the Israeli Trophy kit being perhaps the best known so far – but no NATO nation yet has them in general service. Whisper it softly, but at the present time most western MBTs would fare little better against Ukraine’s hand-held anti-tank weaponry than the Russians have. Or even by an adapted commercial drone available for much less than that? I don’t think so. With a modern western MBT costing up to £8.3 million ($10 million) depending on its final fit, does it really make sense to invest so much in a vehicle that might be destroyed or disabled by a next generation light anti-tank weapon (NLAW) which costs around £33,400 ($40,000)? I do wonder, though, if the West is going in the right direction here, and for a number of reasons. Just look at the most recent iterations of the M1A2 and Leopard 2A7, both remarkable for the myriad of bolt-on bits of kit deemed necessary to meet the threats. Pure numbers aside, it’s clear that the USA and its NATO allies have also plumped for large, increasingly complex, and expensive MBTs, topping 70 tonnes or more when prepared to what is sometimes referred to as “theatre entry standard”. ![]() The UK, for example, currently plans to be able to field only 148 Challenger 3 main battle tanks (MBTs) by 2030, although surely this figure will be upped after recent events in eastern Europe. However, the West seems to have focussed on fewer, higher-spec AFVs. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines. This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. That Russia has been able to continue its assault despite significant losses in men and materiel speaks to the value of having a large inventory, particularly of replacement armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). If the Ukraine war has taught us anything about high-tempo conventional warfare between peer adversaries, it is that numbers matter. ![]()
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